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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Javier Aguilar appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdicts
finding him guilty of three counts of lewd conduct. Aguilar challenges the district
court's evidentiary ruling regarding one portion of expert testimony and his
sentence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
When J.B. was six or seven-years-old, he went to Aguilar's house one to
two times per week to visit his older brother, l.B., who was living with Aguilar and
his children.1

(Trial Tr.2, p.319, Ls.5-15; p.321, L.18 - p.322, L.11.)

On one

occasion when J.B. spent the night at Aguilar's house, Aguilar woke J.B. up in
the middle of the night and invited him to come playa video game in his
bedroom. (Trial Tr., p.326, Ls.2-18.) When J.B. began playing a video game on
Aguilar's bed, Aguilar pulled down J.B.'s pants and underwear, started licking
J.B.'s "butthole" and eventually anally raped J.B. (Trial Tr,. p.326, L.23 - p.329,
L.16.) On a different occasion, Aguilar tried to make J.B. "suck his penis" after
having J.B. first practice by sucking his thumb.

(Trial Tr., p.331, L.8 - p.332,

L.6.) J.B. did not disclose the abuse for two years when he eventually told a
friend. (Trial Tr., p.333, Ls.6-18.) J.B. did not tell anyone sooner because he
1 l.B. lived with Aguilar because l.B.'s and J.B.'s father was in prison and their
mother was bipolar and having difficulty raising both boys herself. (Trial Tr.,
p.321, Ls.5-6; p.322, Ls.3-5; p. see also Sent. Tr., p.39, Ls.23-24.)

2 There are eight transcripts included in the record on appeal. The only
transcripts cited herein are to the transcripts containing the trial ("Trial Tr.") and
the sentencing hearing ("Sent. Tr.").

1

was "scared" and did not think anyone would believe him. (Trial Tr., p.333, L.19
- p.334, L.3.)
C.B. also met Aguilar when he was six-years-old. (Trial Tr., p.361, LS.1012.) Aguilar is C.B.'s uncle's brother and C.B. went to Aguilar's several times a
month to play with Aguilar's children and spend the night with them. (Trial Tr.,
p.360, Ls.14-18; p.364, Ls.19-25; p.367, Ls.1-2.) One night, when C.B. was still
awake playing video games, Aguilar started to undress him.

(Trial Tr., p.368,

Ls.4-22.) Although C.B. could not recall whether Aguilar made any movements
with his penis or whether he ejaculated, C.B. testified that Aguilar put his penis in
his "butt" and that he thought he put it in his anus. (Trial Tr., p.369, L.12 - p.370,
L.21.) C.B. said Aguilar molested him in a similar fashion four to six times. (Trial
Tr., p.371, Ls.17-20.) C.B., like J.B., was too scared to tell anyone and did not
disclose the abuse for several years until he eventually confided in a friend.
(Trial Tr., p.372, L.22 - p.373, L.16.) After telling his friend, it took C.B. another
year to have the courage to tell his mother. (Trial Tr., p.373, Ls.19-25.)
Aguilar also sexually molested J.A. who was friends with Z.B. (Trial Tr.,
p.388, L.21 - p.389, L.2; see generally pp.394-400.) As with his other victims,
Aguilar approached J.A. late at night when J.A. was staying over.

(Trial Tr.,

p.394, L.20 - p.395, L.8.) Aguilar took J.A. into his bedroom, where Aguilar took
J.A.'s clothes off, fondled him, put his penis in J.A.'s "butt crack" and moved it up
and down. (Trial Tr., p.395, L.10 - p.397, L.18.) Aguilar also made J.A. perform
oral sex on him and ejaculated in his mouth. (Trial Tr., p.398, L.10 - p.399, L.1.)
J.A., like Aguilar's other victims, did not tell anyone because he was "scared," but
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he eventually disclosed the abuse to his mother. (Trial Tr., p.400, L.24 - p.401,
L.11.)
None of Aguilar's three victims knew one another. (Trial Tr., p.334, LS.1924; p.374, Ls.4-9; p.402, L.23 - p.403, L.3.)
A grand jury indicted Aguilar on three counts of lewd conduct. (R., Vol. I,
pp.9-11.) At trial, Mydell Yeager, a licensed clinical professional counselor who
specializes in treating children who have been sexually abused, testified about
the dynamics of sexual abuse,

including grooming,

coping mechanisms

employed by the victims of sexual abuse, and issues related to disclosure. (See
generally Trial Tr., pp.188-218.) Ms. Yeager was also permitted to testify, over
Aguilar's objection, about the long-term effects of sexual abuse. 3

(Trial Tr.,

pp.205-209.)
The jury found Aguilar guilty of all three counts alleged in the Indictment.
(R., Vol. I, pp.140-41.) The court imposed a life sentence with seven years fixed
on each count and ordered the sentences to run consecutive.

(R., Vol. II,

pp.298-99.) Aguilar filed a Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. (R.,
Vol. II, pp.329-31, 349-55.)

Aguilar filed a timely notice of appeal from the

judgment. (R., Vol. II, pp.300-03.)
ISSUES

3 Aguilar did not, however, object to Ms. Yeager's testimony generally. His only
pre-trial objection was based on his concern that evidence would be admitted
indicating Ms. Yeager had been recognized as an expert by the courts. (Trial Tr.,
p.163, Ls.8-25.) The state represented that it did not intend to inquire into that
area and Aguilar responded, "[t]hen we don't have an issue." (Trial Tr., p.164,
Ls.10-14.) Consistent with the state's representation, no such evidence was
presented at trial. (See generally Trial Tr., pp.188-244.)

3

Aguilar states the issues on appeal as follows:
1. Did the district court err by allowing the State to present expert
testimony about the negative long-term effects of sexual abuse,
over the objection of defense counsel, as such testimony was
not relevant for the jury's consideration?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist in
this case?
(Appellant's Brief, pA.)

The state rephrases the issues as follows:
1.
Has Aguilar failed to establish the district court erred abused its discretion
in allowing Mydell Yeager's testimony regarding the long-term effects of sexual
abuse on children, which was relevant to the victims' credibility in this case?
2.
Has Aguilar failed to establish his sentences are excessive in light of the
nature of the offenses, the character of the offender, and the objectives of
sentencing?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Aguilar Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Overruling His Relevant Objection To Mydell Yeager's Testimony Relating To
The Long-Term Effects Of Sexual Abuse

A.

Introduction
Aguilar complains the "district court erred in allowing" Ms. Yeager's

testimony "about the long-term effects of sexual abuse." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.)
Specifically, Aguilar contends the testimony was "irrelevant as to whether [he]
committed the alleged crimes" and was therefore "inadmissible under Idaho
Rules of Evidence 401 and 402." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Aguilar's claim fails.
Application of the correct legal standards shows Ms. Yeager's challenged
testimony was relevant to the victims' credibility.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that
discretion.

State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003).

Relevance is a question of law that is subject to free review. State v. Diggs, 141
Idaho 303,305, 108 P.3d 1003, 1005 (Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted).

C.

Aguilar Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Ruling Allowing
Ms. Yeager To Testify About The Long-Term Effects Of Sexual Abuse
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. I.R.E. 401, 402. Evidence

that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, and has
any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable than it would be
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without the evidence is relevant. State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547, 768 P.2d
807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989). Ms. Yeager's testimony about the long-term effects of
sexual abuse was pertinent to the victims' credibility, which is always relevant.
State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 503, 988 P.2d 1170, 1177 (1999) (quoting
State v. Arledge, 119 Idaho 584, 588, 808 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Ct. App.1991)
("whenever evidence is introduced for purposes of impeachment, it necessarily
involves a witness' credibility, and credibility is always relevant"); cf. State v.
Grist, 152 Idaho 786, ---, 275 P.3d 12, 15 (Ct. App. 2012) (discussing !.R.E. 609
and the admissibility of prior felony convictions, which requires the court to
consider "whether the fact or nature of the conviction is relevant to the credibility
of the witness").
The only aspect of Ms. Yeager's testimony that Aguilar objected to was
when the prosecutor asked whether Ms. Yeager could "talk about the long-term
impact of the [sexual] abuse."
based on relevance.

(Trial Tr., p.205, Ls.10-11.)

(Trial Tr., p.205, L.12.)

Aguilar objected

The court asked for the

prosecutor's response, which was that the victims were "going to be talking about
what happened to them years ago," and are "dealing with it now," and the court
overruled the objection without explanation.

(Trial Tr., p.205, Ls.14-17.)

In

response to the prosecutor's question about the long-term impact of the abuse,
Ms. Yeager testified:
They are very vast, and it depends an awful lot on variables
of when they were molested, how long they were molested, how
soon they got into treatment, a lot of those kinds of issues.
But the larger ones are certainly chemical dependency is a
huge one, to deal with the pain that goes on in the flashbacks. Lots
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of kids are very prone to using chemicals, because they try them
and they take away some of the thoughts for a while.
Sometimes in body image, people will have eating disorders,
because they've been so involved in their body that's part of the
reason for that.
Sometimes people have major issues with anger, and some
anger management issues they don't get that worked through.
It obviously has a huge impact on self-esteem if they don't
work those issues through.
You know, just lots of anxiety, depression, you know, being
able to think of themselves as well and as competent people.
Sometimes they become very promiscuous. Sometimes
they shut down sexually, so it is sort of like they don't have any
sexuality at all.
Generally have major, major issues with trusting people, and
that takes a long time to work through.
(Trial Tr., p.205, L.18 - p.206, L.17.)
Contrary to Aguilar's claim on appeal, the district court correctly overruled
Aguilar's relevance objection. In State v. Dutt, 139 Idaho 99, 104-05, 73 P.3d
112, 117-18 (Ct. App. 2003), the Court discussed the proper scope of Ms.
Yeager's testimony, and approved her testimony about "general behavioral and
emotional characteristics of victims and offenders in child sexual abuse."

&

at

105, 73 P.3d at 118. Such testimony is proper because it assists the jury in
"evaluating the victim's credibility."

& Aguilar has offered no reasoned basis for

concluding Ms. Yeager's testimony regarding the long-term effects of sexual
abuse is not relevant for this same purpose.
victims in this case illustrates this point.
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The cross-examination of the

On cross-examination, Aguilar attempted to diminish C.B.'s credibility by
exploiting his mental health issues and his need for medication.

(Trial Tr.,

p.375,L.4 - p.376, L.11.) Aguilar also inquired into J.A.'s current mental health,
asking him whether he went to "normal school" and why he has a "psychosocial
worker" in his life. (Trial Tr., pA04, Ls.9-16.) That victims of sexual abuse suffer
long-lasting psychological consequences as a result of the abuse was relevant to
the victims' credibility at trial where Aguilar sought to diminish their credibility
because of their mental status.
Even if the district court erred in allowing Ms. Yeager to testify about the
long-term impact of child sexual abuse, Aguilar is incorrect in his assertion that
the state cannot meet its burden of showing the error was harmless. (Appellant's
Brief, p.8.) This Court can easily conclude that Ms. Yeager's testimony about the
long-term impact of sexual abuse was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010) ("A defendant
appealing from an objected-to, non-constitutionally-based error shall have the
duty to establish that such an error occurred, at which point the State shall have
the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
The evidence in this case was overwhelming.

All three victims gave

detailed accounts of the sexual abuse they suffered at the hands of Aguilar. Ms.
Yeager's limited testimony regarding the long-term effects of such abuse was
minimal in comparison to the victims' testimony and in comparison to the
remainder of her testimony to which Aguilar did not object. In other words, the
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jury would have convicted Aguilar on all three counts alleged in the Indictment
even without Ms. Yeager's brief testimony about which Aguilar complains.
Aguilar's claim to the contrary fails.

II.
Aguilar Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Imposing Sentence
A.

Introduction
Aguilar claims the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentence

"in light of the support he enjoys and the fact the present convictions were his
first felony convictions." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Application of well-established
sentencing standards to the facts presented to the district court reveals Aguilar
has failed to meet his heavy burden of establishing the district court abused its
discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Where the sentence imposed by a trial court is within statutory limits, the

appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion."
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and
citations omitted). "In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ." !9.,.

C.

Aguilar Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Imposing Sentence
"[T]he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness."

Miller,151 Idaho at 834, 264 P.3d at 941 (quotations and citation omitted).
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"When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make an
independent examination of the record, "having regard to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest."

!5;L A review of the record demonstrates that a life sentence, with 21-years fixed,
for the horrible sexual abuse of three young boys was more than reasonable.
Aguilar has failed to establish otherwise.
The four objectives of sentencing are well-established.

They are "(1)

protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3)
the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution."

State v.

Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319-320, 144 P.3d 23, 24-25 (2006) (quotations and
citations omitted). "A sentence need not serve all sentencing goals; one may be
sufficient."

State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003)

(citing State v. Waddell, 119 Idaho 238, 241,804 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Ct. App.
1991». "[G]eneral deterrence is a sufficient basis for the imposition of a period of
incarceration." State v. Robison, 119 Idaho 890, 893, 811 P.2d 500, 503 (Ct.
App. 1991 ) (citations omitted). Sentence may also be imposed based upon the
objective of punishment or retribution. See Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 285, 77 P.3d
at 974; see also State v. Whittle, 145 Idaho 49, 175 P.3d 211 (Ct. App. 2007)
(affirming ten-year sentence with eight years fixed on felony injury to child charge
involving death of a child and noting "[t]he offense to which [defendant] pleaded
is very grave"); State v. Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776,777,769 P.2d 1148,1149 (Ct.
App. 1989) (''To the extent that a minimum period of confinement represents the
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judicially determined 'price' of a crime, the criteria of retribution and deterrence
are particularly important.")
In imposing sentence on Aguilar, the district court considered all of the
information before it as well as the objectives of sentencing (Sent. Tr., p.73, L.23
- p,74,L.16), and stated:
We have had a lot of information provided to the court, but the core
information, the really important matters which I have to consider
and factor into this matter, is that we had no less than these three
victims and the other victimstJ These were very vulnerable
children, little boys who trusted you, who were vulnerable. Your
behavior was atrocious, you sexually abused them in terrible ways.
(Sent. Tr., p.81, L.22 - p.82, L.3.)
While it is nice for Aguilar that he has the support of people he has not
victimized, this support in no way warrants a lesser sentence. State v. Moore, 78
Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1957) ("Important as are the humanitarian
considerations affecting the accused, his family and other relatives, and the
important to society of rehabilitation itself, such considerations cannot be allowed
to control or defeat punishment, where other factors are ignore or subordinated
to the detriment of society.") As explained by the district court:

The state's Sentencing Memorandum recounts the abuse suffered by victims
who were not the subject of the charged offenses in this case. Those victims
include: (1) M.A. who was ten to eleven-years old when he stayed the night at
Aguilar's house and Aguilar made him undress so he could give him a full-body
"massage," which included touching M.A.'s penis and bottom; (2) C.E. who was
nine to ten-years-old when he stayed the night at Aguilar's house and Aguilar
started rubbing his back and offered him candy to come into this office, but C.E.
refused; (3) N.P. who was seven to eight-years old when he disclosed that
Aguilar sexually molested him; and (4) l.B., J.B.'s brother who was living with
Aguilar, and disclosed Aguilar "molested him too many times to count," including
oral sex and anal rape. (R., Vol. II, pp.181-82.)
4
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[Y]ou are a person of many faces. And the face you put on to the
community and the business acquaintances you have is not the
face that you put on to the children. And part of your adulation you
had from the community actually, unfortunately, facilitated this,
because people trusted you. The mothers of these children trusted
you. You appeared to be an all-American good guy.
But, in reality, you had this very deep, dark and predatory
secret, and you used your relationships - and I think it is properly
characterized in the evidence I heard that all of these children were
groomed. They were invited into the home of Mr. Aguilar who had
all of these things, video games, he's friendly, friendly guy in the
neighborhood, the kids could come over and spend the night. But
there was a sinister and dark side to that, and that was the plan in
the back of your mind, that given an opportunity you would victimize
the child.
(Sent. Tr., p.79, Ls.9-24.)
Aguilar is a pedophile who preyed upon little boys whose fathers were not
involved in their lives. (Psychosexual Evaluation; Trial Tr., p.32D, L.2 - p.321,
L.15; p.363, Ls.1-6; p.39D, Ls.21-23.)
families cannot be overstated.

The impact on the victims and their

C.B. tried to commit suicide as a result of

Aguilar's abuse and was admitted to Intermountain Hospital "seven times within
three years."

(R., Vol. I, pp.45-46; Sent. Tr., p.41, Ls.15-17.)

"introverted and lacked interest in everything around him."

J.B. became

(Sent. Tr., p.39,

Ls.2D-22.) J.A. "will need continual help with his relationships." (Sent. Tr., p.36,
Ls.1-2.) Z.B. ran away when Aguilar was arrested and could not be located prior
to trial (R., Vol. I, pp.72-73; R., Vol. II, p.191); at the time of sentencing, his
mother still did not know his whereabouts (Sent. Tr., p.4D, Ls.12-18). The nature
of Aguilar's offenses alone is enough to justify the sentences imposed.
Aguilar also claims his "limited criminal history," which consists of
misdemeanor convictions and a withheld judgment for aggravated battery,
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"should counsel towards a reduced sentence." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) To the
contrary, this factor deserves no more weight than that afforded to it by the
district court (Sent. Tr., p.82, Ls.12-14), particularly given that Aguilar was
committing felony sex offenses against children for years before he was finally
arrested.
Aguilar has failed to establish his life sentence with 21 years fixed is
excessive.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdicts finding Aguilar guilty of three counts of lewd conduct.
DATED this 23 rd day of July, 2011.

JESS C M. LORELLO
Deput ttorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23 rd day of July, 2012, served two
true and correct copies of the attached RESPONDENTS BRIEF by causing file
stamped copies addressed to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appel/ate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

Attorney General
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